The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Issue 15 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2007-07-26
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII,
Issue 15
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11826
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 13, Number 15 (July 26, 2007) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Succession complex and apparat apprehension 
President Putin's recent bombastic rhetoric, along with his decision to withdraw 
from the CFE treaty (announced just days after the photo-friendly Lobster 
Summit), perpetuates the illusion of a strong, resurgent Russia, buoyed by 
petrodollars and forging its own "pole" in world affairs.  In truth however, there is 
a crack in Russia's foundation that threatens to destabilize the state and its 
system of governance.   
 
Succession is the hobgoblin of many transitional states, which may have thrown 
off oppressive military rule or evicted a colonial power, but cannot seem to let go 
of the initial revolutionary or "democratic" leadership, in favor of establishing a 
lasting institutionalized succession.  Russia, which has substantial historical 
baggage on the issue of succession, also has not managed to develop a 
"mechanism" that is telegraphed in advance to the population and allows for a 
natural growth of political parties, including opposition groups, which compete in 
the choice of presidential successor.  (1) 
 
Although Yel'tsin did not insist on clinging to power personally, his extended 
"Family," likely for fear of impoverishment or imprisonment by the next regime, 
devised a means of bringing Vladimir Putin to power in the hopes that he would 
prove loyal, compliant, and would prefer to look forward rather than to the sins of 
the past. (2)  Clearly, not all members received what they bargained for. 
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At that point, Yel'tsin was extremely ill, and his weaknesses had become all too 
evident to the public.   Following the devaluation of the ruble in 1998, his power 
ebbed to the point that the choice of prime minister was made almost by 
acclamation.  And the prime minister, sensing frailty in the president, attacked his 
entourage, likely as a precursor to attacks on Yel'tsin himself.  
 
Members of the Yel'tsin Family could do little but create a scenario that required 
a sure hand and put Putin to it, anointing him successor and working their magic 
for his eventual election as president.  It seems likely that Putin has exceeded 
their every expectation, positively and negatively. 
 
But what is Putin to do now that his term of office approaches an end?  There is 
no clearly marked trail for succession.  As we have seen from the Litvinenko 
debate over whether or not the Russian Constitution allows extradition of its 
citizens (it does), the text of the 1993 Constitution is remarkably malleable for 
state officials, especially when the state controls the main media outlets.  
Apparently, the current president believes that criticism from the west, when 
Russia refuses to observe accepted norms of international behavior, is less a 
reflection of Russia's own actions than the "colonial thinking" of its critics.  (3) If 
Putin were to sidestep the constitutional term limits of his presidency, would 
western criticism have any impact on his decision?   If a popular referendum 
produced overwhelming support for such a decision, would the results silence 
critics or would Russia press on as a "sovereign democracy"? 
 
For the time being, Putin has stressed his intention to observe his 
constitutionally-mandated term limit and step aside for a successor.  Within 
Russia, this possibility is fraught with tension.  Absent an institutionalized process 
and viable, credible political parties to conduct an election campaign, the 
selection of a presidential successor seems to constitute the mandate of the 
present Kremlin occupant(s). 
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At this moment, there appear to be two clear "frontrunner candidates" for 
successor.  Yet, it seems unlikely that even they believe that one of them will, in 
fact, become Russia's next president (at least in 2008).   Putin and his top 
advisers hint at currently unknown or perhaps regional candidates, second-tier 
possibilities from within the government or apparat, and, of course the potential 
for a Putin third term. 
 
This uncertainty leaves concerned citizens, domestic and foreign analysts, and 
investors all to resort to the techniques of Sovietology in close observation of 
detail in media coverage, pictures, personnel changes, and Kremlin comments. 
 
Unfortunately, the difficulties in reading the portents coming from the Kremlin are 
nearly as onerous now as in the Soviet era, since seemingly minor shifts in policy 
or personnel can have significant repercussions.  Within the current Russian 
elite, the issue is critical.  
 
Does more prevalent press coverage of Dmitri Medvedev represent a surge for 
the economically-liberal wing of the president's clutch?  Was Sergei Naryshkin's 
appointment to the Supervisory Council of Vnesheconombank or to head the 
Commission to Ensure Russia's Presence on Spitsbergen [Svalbard] Archipelago 
a sign that he is pulling ahead in the dark horse race? (4)  Perhaps the most 
perplexing issue for foreign policymakers is the question of western opinion:  
Does a putative hard-line from the West increase the likelihood of a siloviki 
candidate emerging in Russia?  (Hint: The siloviki will be at Putin's right hand no 
matter what are the comments from the West.) 
 
In many ways the answers to these questions will be a relief from the tension and 
uncertainty that Russia's current transitional succession holds.  It is this very 
uncertainty, produced by the need to have the broadest range of possible 
succession options available to Putin and his entourage that also undermines the 
image of a strong, resurgent Russia, which Putin works so diligently to project. 
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Speaking of succession signs… 
What could Security Council (SC) Secretary Igor Ivanov possibly have done to 
get himself ousted from the so-called "dumping grounds" that has been the 
Security Council of late?  Reports indicate that he resigned and intends to leave 
state service, in order to pursue a teaching career.  (5) 
 
The Security Council is an executive organ — its powers and functions are ill 
defined and highly dependent on the relative influence of the Secretary and the 
will of the president.  Under the leadership of Yuri Skokov, its creation, early in 
Yel'tsin's first presidency, focused on the formation and staffing of a Russian 
Armed Forces and Defense Ministry (as separate from the Soviet or proposed 
CIS Joint Forces), as well as on the management of potential emergency 
situations; its purview eventually branched out to the vetting of other Yel'tsin 
appointees and to wider policy formulation authority, but Yel'tsin's March 1993 
declaration of "Special Rule" caused a rift with Skokov that resulted in a 
diminution of SC authority.  Other Secretaries, including the charismatic, if gruff, 
General Aleksandr Lebed pushed to refashion the Security Council, with little 
lasting effect. 
 
Still, the Security Council has remarkable potential and can be molded to create 
an extremely powerful and authoritative body, given the right leadership. 
 
With Ivanov's departure, President Putin has tapped Col-Gen Valentin Sobolev to 
be Secretary of the Council on an "acting" basis.  (6) Sobolev is a deputy of the 
Security Council, longtime KGB and FCS intelligence officer and close associate 
of Putin's, who recently led negotiations with Iran over Russia's offer to process 
its Uranium.  He also is an expert on counter-terrorism.  
 
Sobolev frequently is quoted in the media and his comments on anti-terrorism 
measures, particularly the need to control the media in order to prevent it being 
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used by the terrorists as an instrument to spread fear among the population (6) 
are controversial, as are his remarks on the power of ideas: 
 
"World history shows that extremism begins with an idea.  If it is not resisted at 
the level of ideas—if some extremist postulate or challenge passes unnoticed—
then forces will gradually emerge to put those ideas into practice for their own 
purposes, arming themselves with these slogans to try to achieve their economic 
political, or criminal objective." (8) 
 
Certainly, Sobolev's appointment would be controversial if he had not simply 
been named "acting" Secretary. President Putin, a former Secretary of the 
Security Council himself, likely will replace his SC "placeholder," but the 
questions and the uncertainty rise about the timing – Who will replace Sobolev, 
as well as when and why?  
 
Perhaps most interestingly, will the Security Council itself have a role to play in 
the upcoming succession?  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) For more on the Russia's historical and current struggles with creating a 
succession "mechanism," please see Flawed Succession: Russia's Power 
Transfer Crises, Ed. by Uri Ra'anan, Rowman-Littlefield (Lexington Books), 2006. 
(2) It is possible that certain members of the Yel'tsin Family believed that they 
had sufficient kompromat on Putin to keep him in line.  Whether or not his loyalty 
to many of them was a matter of honor or blackmail is a question for historians 
some time hence. 
(3) "Putin gets heated in Nashi talk," By David Nowak, The Moscow Times, 25 
Jul 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) "Government appoints members of Vnesheconombank Supervisory Council," 
SKRIN Market & Corporate News, 3 Jul 07; "Deputy Premier to Head Russian 
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Commission on Svalbard Archipelago," Interfax news agency, 0859 GMT, 16 Jul 
07; BBC Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) "Putin alone will guess right," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 Jul 07; Defense and 
Security WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7)  "One (informational) step from terrorist to journalist," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
27 Apr 04; Agency What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(8) "The goal of terrorism is to change the world," Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, 
No. 46, November 2006; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Creela Henderson 
 
Law on the run 
When the Tverskoi District Court in Moscow issued a warrant for the arrest of a 
prominent defense lawyer on charges of disclosing state secrets, the accused, 
Boris Kuznetsov, was not present at the hearing. Citing illness as the cause of 
his absence from court that day, July 11, Kuznetsov resurfaced one week later at 
an undisclosed location in Europe and issued a statement calling the charges 
against him “revenge” for his dogged determination in challenging the power of 
Russia’s elite law enforcement agencies: the Procurator General, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and particularly the FSB. (1)  Law enforcement agencies face a 
determined adversary in Kuznetsov, who avowed that “if the evidence of 
innocence is located in a pile of crap and my hands are tied, I will obtain the 
evidence with my teeth.” (2) 
             
The charges leading up to the warrant for Kuznetsov’s arrest arose out of his 
defense of former Federation Council Senator Levon Chakhmakhchyan, who 
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stands accused of soliciting bribes in June 2006. At that time, 
Chakhmakhchyan’s immunity as a parliamentarian did not prevent the FSB from 
setting up a sting operation in which agents wiretapped the senator’s phone and 
marked a bundle of dollar bills that subsequently were discovered in his 
briefcase. In building a defense, Kuznetsov submitted a copy of the wiretap 
recordings made by the FSB to the Constitutional Court, alleging that his client’s 
rights as a citizen and member of parliament had been violated. When the office 
of the Procurator General accused Kuznetsov of divulging state secrets by 
turning over the covert recordings, the defense lawyer countered that according 
to Article 7 of the law regarding state secrets: “Information regarding the violation 
of a citizen’s rights and freedom shall not be regarded as classified.” (3)  
Undeterred, prosecutors demanded that Kuznetsov sign a statement that would 
prohibit him from disclosing the facts of Chakhmakhchyan’s case, thus 
attempting to classify by force that which is unclassifiable by law. Kuznetsov 
refused the dubious proposition, and found himself accused of a crime that 
carries a four year prison term. 
 
Inter alia 
Kuznetsov is not the only public defender to draw the wrath of Russian 
prosecutors. His own lawyer, Viktor Parshutkin, spent three years in a Moscow 
prison cell, awaiting trial on charges relating to his defense of a couple who ran 
afoul of Russian adoption authorities. Lawyers who have taken on the country’s 
most sensitive cases have become the likeliest targets for official repression. In 
2003, Igor Trunov brought 24 suits against the city of Moscow, on behalf of 
victims of the Dubrovka Theater siege that ended in the death of 130 captives in 
October 2002. The suits were thrown perfunctorily out of court and Trunov was 
marked as a persona non grata by law enforcement authorities, who attempted to 
strip him of his legal credentials in January of this year, again, for disclosing state 
secrets. (4)  
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Likewise, the legal team representing Yukos’ chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky has 
suffered a barrage of harassment from law enforcement officials, including 
arrests, searches and seizures of defense materials. Non-Russian members of 
the team have been expelled from the country, while their Russian colleagues 
face disbarment proceedings at home. Events veered into the twilight zone last 
spring, when Khodorkovsky issued a statement from prison defending his lawyer, 
Karinna Moskalenko, against charges brought by the Procurator General, who 
sought to have Moskalenko disbarred for failing to represent her client 
adequately. (5)  In a statement addressed to the Office of the Procurator General 
and the Moscow Bar Association, Khodorkovsky demands his right as a 
defendant to select his own council: “I believe that I’m totally entitled to fully and 
independently choose the issues and the lawyers and the amount they 
participate in the case.” He added trenchantly, “I believe that by trying to order 
my lawyers around, the prosecutor’s office is not defending me, but is violating 
my rights.” (6) 
 
State vs. law 
The rights upon which Khodorkovsky insists are enshrined in a legal code that 
has been under attack in recent years, as law enforcement organs move with 
impunity and without legal grounds against citizens who pose a challenge to 
state authority. “They see disclosure of state secrets in a lawyer sending 
documents to the Constitutional Court. This is nonsense,” Genry Reznik, 
chairman of the Russian Bar Association, said in an interview broadcast on Ekho 
Moskvy. “I can assess it as something absolutely idiotic, or have to realize that 
the special services are beyond the reach of law and can do anything they want.” 
(8) 
 
Identifying the source of the campaign against defense lawyers is a dangerous 
proposition in Russia, where the pliant legal system remains in the hands of 
government prosecutors. Kuznetsov is quick to reject the idea that the Kremlin is 
responsible for the criminal charges being brought against him, pointing instead 
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to special service figures acting from within the shadows of the FSB. “There are 
some people from the special services, in the law enforcement agencies, who 
think that if the president is a former KGB officer then they can do whatever they 
want,” he said. (9)  And what do “they” want? Simply, to ply their clandestine 
trade without fear of exposure. But, that is exactly what a defense lawyer does: in 
order to defend a client, each of the smallest details of a case must be exposed 
to the light of law and examined. Mikhail Barshevsky, the government’s 
representative to the Constitutional Court, understands that “a lawyer is obliged 
to protect his defendants and to file appeals.” Commenting on the case of 
Kuznetsov, he added, “the Tverskoi District Court ruled incorrectly, and this 
shows that judges simply don’t understand the lawyer’s function.” (10)  
Remarkable as it may seem that a court of law lacks comprehension of the role 
of lawyers, such is the case in many Russian courtrooms, where the conviction 
rate in cases heard by judges still held at around 99 percent in 2005, following a 
decade of reforms aimed at creating an independent judiciary. (11)  “Lawyers are 
the last bastion before Russian lawlessness, which is flourishing in the absence 
of a normally functioning and independent judicial system,” said Kuznetsov from 
his place of hiding. (12) 
 
Justice elsewhere 
The recent high-profile campaigns against defense attorneys have galvanized 
the Russian Bar Association to unite in defense of its members. On June 21, the 
Moscow Bar Association refused to bow to pressure from the Procurator 
General’s office, voting instead to reaffirm Moskalenko’s legal credentials. Bar 
Association Chairman Genry Reznik vowed to mobilize support among Russian 
lawyers for Kuznetsov, and expressed confidence that the criminal proceedings 
will fade away under the glare of international opprobrium. (13) Meanwhile, 
Kuznetsov remains on the lam, unable to take refuge in the laws of his own 
country. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) “Prominent defense lawyer flees Russia,” Reuters, 18 Jul 07 via 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1619999320070718?pageNum
ber=1). 
(2) “No lawyers, no problem,” Vedomosti, 16 Jul 07 via 
(http://www.vedomosti.ru/). 
(3) Ibid.  
(4) “Prosecutors Want Trunov Disbarred,” The Moscow Times, 19 Jan 07 via 
(http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/01/19/001.html). 
(5) “Russia's Champion of Hopeless Cases Is Targeted for Disbarment,” The 
Washington Post, 3 Jun 07 via (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060201135.html). 
(6) Statement by Mikhail Khodorkovsky addressed to the Moscow Bar 
Association and to the Office of the Procurator General, 5 May 07 via 
(http://www.khodorkovsky.info/after_cassation/violations_against_defence_team/
135273.html). 
(7) “Russian prosecutors open investigation against prominent lawyer who fled 
country,” Associated Press Worldstream, 18 Jul 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) “Prominent defense lawyer flees Russia,” Reuters, 18 Jul 07 via 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1619999320070718?pageNum
ber=1). 
(9) “Lawyer Flees Russia Over ‘Political’ Case,” The Moscow Times, 16 Jul 07 
via (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/). 
(10) Statistics for cases heard by juries indicate an acquittal rate of 15%. “Fear 
Rules in Russia’s Courtrooms,” Washington Post, 27 Feb 05 via 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56441-
2005Feb26?language=printer). 
(11) “Prominent defense lawyer flees Russia,” Reuters, 18 Jul 07 via 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1619999320070718?pageNum
ber=1). 
(12) Ibid.  
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(13) “President of the Moscow Bar Association Genry Reznik estimates that in 
two to three weeks the case against Boris Kuznetsov will end,” Ekho Moskvy, 20 
Jul 07, via (http://echo.msk.ru/news/386334.html). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
FSB extends its “foreign tentacles” 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s KGB was broken up 
and different agencies were assigned different bailiwicks. The FSB was to handle 
domestic counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence, while the SVR and the GRU 
exclusively were to be responsible for foreign intelligence gathering operations.  
    
Since the ascendancy of President Vladimir Putin, the FSB has been steadily 
encroaching on the territory of its rival agencies. It has re-absorbed FAPSI and 
the Border Guard Service, and apparently taken control of the MVD. In July 
2006, Russia’s Duma passed legislation allowing the FSB to operate abroad, in 
order to hunt down extremists or those who “libelously criticize the regime.” (1) It 
is entirely possible that the FSB’s major action abroad under this legislation was 
the assassination in November 2006 of Aleksandr Litvinenko.  In recent weeks, it 
has become clear that the FSB is making a move to solidify its new “foreign 
jurisdiction.”  
    
Speaking to the Federation Council late in June, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev 
addressed the “terrorist and other criminal activities targeted against Russian 
facilities, institutions and citizens outside Russian Federation Territory.” (2) Due 
to the “increasing number” of these incidents, a Crisis Situation Center is to be 
set up within the Foreign Ministry. The Center’s role will be to “organize 
situational responses” to terrorist incidents. (3) Significantly, such Centers also 
are to be set up within Russian embassies abroad. (4) Both the domestic and 
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foreign centers are to be staffed by “special service personnel,” although the 
local ambassador will be in charge (probably in name only). (5)  
     
That a territorial battle exists between GRU, SVR and FSB has been clear for 
some time. However, the creation of foreign Crisis Situation Centers indicates a 
renewed offensive: If it is true that these offices are to be staffed exclusively by 
“special service” (read FSB?) officers, then that agency is actively taking steps to 
diminish (at least) the roles of GRU and SVR officers posted in parts foreign. 
 
Update: Trepashkin: Pyrrhic victory amid abuse allegations 
Mikhail Trepashkin, a former FSB officer and lawyer was sentenced to a four-
year prison term after being convicted of espionage in May 2004. At the time of 
his arrest, Trepashkin was representing individuals accused of the 1999 
apartment bombings. As part of his defense arguments, Trepashkin had planned 
to introduce evidence of FSB complicity in the atrocity. As such, his arrest likely 
was designed purely to silence an inconvenient voice.  
    
In the aftermath of Aleksandr Litvinenko’s assassination last fall, Trepashkin 
revealed to the BBC from his jail cell that he allegedly had been part of an FSB 
team ordered to monitor Litvinenko, in preparation for his removal.  Russian 
authorities were quick to respond to Trepashkin’s statements. On March 9 2007, 
the courts ruled that he should be moved to a higher security prison with stricter 
conditions. (6) 
    
Allegations of abuse against Trepashkin have been in the public realm since his 
arrest. Amnesty International has claimed that he is being denied vital asthma 
medication, (7) while Lev Ponomarev (Executive Director of the Movement for 
Human Rights) has received “numerous reports” of “violations in custody.” (8) 
The full extent of the abuse allegations is not clear—but according to a letter 
written in December 2006 by Trepashkin, the abuse included placing him in a cell 
“contaminated with poisonous chemicals.” (9) Early in July, Russia’s Federal 
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Penal Service (FPS) released a statement arguing that human rights allegations 
vis à vis Trepashkin did “not correspond to reality” and claiming that “no offences 
have been committed against the convict Trepashkin.” The “evidence” cited for 
this claim was the statement by the “chief of IZ-66/1 of the FPS Directorate for 
Sverdlovsk Region.” (10) This denial—given its origin—can hardly be taken at 
face value.     
    
Ten days after the FPS issued its statement, the European Court of Human 
Rights announced a ruling in the first of three complaints filed by Trepashkin’s 
representatives, since 2003. According to the court, the treatment meted out to 
the defendant in the aftermath of his arrest “amounted to degrading treatment,” 
while his detention was “unlawful.” (11) At the time of writing, the Kremlin has not 
reacted to the Court’s decision, but it is safe to say it will be ignored—or, as in 
the past—painted as politically motivated Russophobism. (12) Trepashkin’s 
apparent insider knowledge is a danger to President Putin and the siloviki at 
large. As such, it is safe to assume that either he will never leave prison–or that 
he will be silenced permanently upon his release.  The European Court of 
Human Rights’ decision is little more than a pyrrhic victory. 
 
Litvinenko update: tit-for-tat expulsions 
On 22 May, after 6 months of investigation, Britain’s Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) officially announced that it would seek the extradition of former KGB 
officer Andrei Lugovoi, on suspicion of murder. British officials were at pains to 
stress that the case was being viewed purely as a criminal, rather than an 
intelligence matter. Moscow’s response to extradition requests was to state—
albeit apparently informally—that the Russian constitution precluded any citizen’s 
extradition to a foreign power – without exception. (13) Russia’s stance was 
confirmed officially on July 5 with a letter from Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika’s 
office to the British Home Office, stating that it was “not possible to satisfy the 
request of the British side to extradite Andrei Lugovoi.” (14)  
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Britain’s response to Moscow’s decision was not slow in arriving.  Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown’s spokesman stated that the extradition veto was “extremely 
disappointing,” adding that the Prime Minister “deeply” regretted that “Russia has 
failed to show the necessary level of cooperation on in this matter.” (15) 
Westminster’s response was not limited to this statement. On 16 July, Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband informed the House of Commons that Britain had no 
choice but to send a “clear and proportionate signal” to Moscow: as such, the 
Government had decided to expel “four particular diplomats” from the Russian 
embassy. (16) Miliband added that talks aimed at speeding up the visa 
application procedure both for diplomats and Russian citizens would be 
suspended. (17)  
 
Moscow’s initial response to the expulsions was to brand Britain’s actions as 
“immoral” and “Russophobic.” (18) Then, on 19 July, Moscow, in what amounted 
to a tit-for-tat response, announced that four British diplomats had been declared 
Persona non grata, and had ten days to leave the country.  Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Mikhail Kamynin stated that British officials would no longer receive 
visas, and that Russia would cease its cooperation with Britain in the Global War 
on Terrorism. (19) 
    
In conjunction with its diplomatic actions, Russia has focused on alleged Secret 
Intelligence Service (MI-6) activities on its soil, specifically linked to Andrei 
Lugovoi’s allegations that Litvinenko was an MI6 agent, who tried to recruit him. 
(20) These investigations have intensified in recent weeks, as a result of a 
personal “coming out.”  
    
Several days after Lugovoi’s May 31 press conference, Vyacheslav Zharko, a 
former Special Services Officer, contacted the FSB. According to the FSB’s 
public relations office, Zharko admitted that he had been a long-time MI6 double 
agent and gave his inquisitors details of “when, by whom and in what 
circumstances he had been recruited.” (21) Zharko apparently voluntarily turned 
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himself in because he “feared for his life,” partly due to the fact that his handlers 
had “insisted” he meet them “in a European city” outside Russia. (22)  
  Zharko was employed by Boris Berezovsky during the 1990s and traveled to 
London in 2002 to meet him and Litvinenko. (23) In an interview with Moskovskii 
komsomolets, Zharko alleged that the tycoon had recruited him for MI6 during his 
stay in London. Much of the interview was devoted to tarring Berezovsky, while 
painting Litvinenko as “a typical con-man,” and “worthless” double agent. 
Litvinenko, according to Zharko, had begun claiming that “it’s all over for Putin,” 
adding that “there would be some event that would shake Russia and the whole 
world.” (24) The insinuation was that Litvinenko was removed because it is 
against Britain’s interests to see Putin’s regime end.  
    
Zharko’s curriculum vitae—and his allegations against Berezovsky—
automatically render his story and his “confession” suspicious. It has been clear 
since Litvinenko’s death, that the Kremlin remains focused on extraditing 
Berezovsky. Russia evidently is building a (somewhat convoluted) case against 
the oligarch that contends he is a British agent who ordered or instigated 
Litvinenko’s murder. The end result of this “case” will likely be a further 
extradition attempt against Berezovsky, on charges of being a traitor to the 
Rodina. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 5 (7 Dec 06).  
(2) “‘Good At Diplomacy’ FSB Director Patrushev is Setting Up A Crisis Center to 
Negotiate With Foreign Terrorists Who Take Russian Citizens Hostage,” Novaya 
gazeta, 28 Jun 07; What The Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Ibid.  
(4) “Russia To Set Up Emergency Centers At Embassies Abroad,” ITAR-TASS, 
Moscow, in Russian, 3 Jul 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(5) “‘Good At Diplomacy’ FSB Director Patrushev is Setting Up A Crisis Center to 
Negotiate With Foreign Terrorists Who Take Russian Citizens Hostage,” Novaya 
gazeta, 28 Jun 07; What The Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) See The ISICP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 10 (29 Mar 07).  
(7) “Russia; Further Information On Health Concern/Denial of Medical Treatment: 
Mikhail Ivanovich Trepashkin,” Amnesty International Urgent Action Network, 13 
Mar 07 via www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR460072007. 
(8) “Russian Authorities Deny Abuse Against Ex-FSB Officer,” ITAR-TASS, 
Moscow, in Russian, 10 Jul 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “Strasbourg Ruling Backs Trepashkin,” The Moscow Times, 20 Jul 07 via 
www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/07/20/011.html  
(10) “Russian Authorities Deny Abuse Against Ex-FSB Officer,” ITAR-TASS, 
Moscow, in Russian, 10 Jul 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) “Strasbourg Ruling Backs Trepashkin,” The Moscow Times, 20 Jul 07 via 
www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/07/20/011.html  
(12) Ibid.  
(13) “Lugovoi Says Litvinenko Was British Spy,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Features Article, 31 May 07 via 
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/5/7E9DC1E6-5BFE-4C1B-9636-
EC156A636309.html. 
(14) “Russia Rejects Britain’s Request For Lugovoi Extradition,” Xinhua News 
Agency, 5 Jul 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) “Brown Denounces Moscow’s Extradition Refusal,” The International Herald 
Tribune, 11 Jul 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(16) “Putin Vows Revenge As Britain Expels Four Diplomats,” The Daily 
Telegraph, 17 Jul 07.  
(17) “Britain Expels Four Russian Diplomats,” The Guardian, 16 Jul 07 via 
www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2127730,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfr
ont. 
(18) “Moscow Brands Expulsion of Diplomats From UK ‘Russophobic,’” RIA 
Novosti, 16 Jul 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
The Lobster Summit and the current state of US-Russian relations 
The somewhat leisurely and informal meeting between United States President 
George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 2 at the Bush 
family home in Kennebunkport, Maine, comes at a rather low point in US-
Russian relations. The first half of 2007 was marked by Putin’s Munich speech, 
which some compared to Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton; (1) 
by angry Russian denunciation of a proposed American anti-ballistic missile 
system based in Poland and the Czech Republic; by American unease and 
frustration at Russia’s dealings with Iran; and, most recently, by the diametrically 
opposite stances taken by Russia on the one hand and the US and the EU on 
the other regarding the question of the future status of Kosovo. In light of these 
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developments, the summit was probably intended to be an opportunity, if not 
actually to improve relations, at least to make the dialogue more civil; to take a 
step back from the rhetoric of Munich. With that limited goal in mind, the summit 
was a success: both presidents described it as very positive and productive. (2) 
However, instead of trying to predict the effects of this particular summit on US-
Russian relations, it may instead be more worthwhile to use it as an occasion to 
reflect on this relationship more generally, and only then to place the summit into 
context. 
 
Whether or not US-Russian relations really were that bad in the first part of 2007, 
and whether or not the so-called Lobster Summit helped to improve them, the 
striking feature about the current bilateral US-Russian relationship is how 
relatively peripheral it seems – both for Russia and for the United States. This is 
in contrast not only to the days of the Cold War, when relations between Moscow 
and Washington were a matter of utmost importance to the entire world, but even 
to the 1990s, when issues such as NATO expansion, the war in former 
Yugoslavia, and major events in Russia itself such as the 1993 coup attempt and 
the 1996 elections made Russia at least a frequent item in the international 
section of major news agencies. 
 
For better or for worse, this simply does not seem to be the case just now. These 
days, the war in Iraq is by far the leading item on the American foreign policy 
agenda, and, based on the way things are going, this can be expected to last for 
quite some time, unless, that is, there is another even more serious armed 
conflict. Russia’s attention, meanwhile, is turned first and foremost to the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, especially ones with which Russia is 
involved in long-standing territorial disputes, such as Georgia and Moldova. 
Thus, due to this preoccupation with smaller neighboring countries, the current 
superpower and the former superpower essentially have little time for each other. 
Bush may or may not have a personal rapport with Putin –the New York Times 
Moscow correspondent and author David Satter calls it a myth (3) – but even if 
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he does, it is nothing like the actual friendship that former US President Bill 
Clinton had with the late former Russian President Boris Yel’tsin. 
 
The fact that, on the whole, the current state of US-Russian relations is more bad 
than good is not the result of Putin’s harsh rhetoric at Munich or of US missile 
defense plans in Eastern Europe, but rather a product of conflicting geopolitical 
interests that, it must be admitted, had taken shape well before Putin or Bush 
came to power. Thus, in the Middle East, Russia has chosen to back the 
“Tehran-Damascus Axis:” the countries most directly opposed to US interests in 
the region (and also ones in direct support of terrorist organizations such as 
Hezbollah and Hamas). In southeastern Europe, Russia has consistently sided 
with Serbia—the country opposed by nearly everyone else—since the outbreak 
of civil war in former Yugoslavia. These policies have been more or less 
consistent from Yel’tsin to Putin; thus, the reason that they have led to increased 
friction with the US during the period of the Bush Jr. administration is the 
increased US physical presence in the Middle East. By the same token, a 
noticeable decrease in US interest in the Balkans has led to a relative reduction 
in US-Russian tensions in that region; recent diplomatic wrangling over the future 
of Kosovo is a far cry from the shouting matches and threats of war during the 
days of the 1998 NATO bombing campaign of Serbia. Another long-term source 
of Moscow’s discontent has been NATO expansion further into former “Soviet 
Territory” – first into the former countries of the Warsaw Pact, and later into 
former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), with perhaps more to join 
in the future. This expansion has represented, from Moscow’s point of view, a 
continued post-Soviet shrinking of Russia’s power and influence in the world – a 
perception that, in part, explains the choice of aligning with countries opposed to 
the US, as a way of gaining leverage in a position of weakness. 
 
The latest downturn in relations, then, is for the most part a continuation of trends 
already in existence, with a few changes. One is the increase in US-Iranian 
tensions, which by extension reflects greater tension between the US and Iran’s 
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sponsor state. The other has to do with the fact that, at least for a time, Putin has 
rather obviously been using the anti-American card for domestic consumption. As 
Council for Foreign Relations analyst Stephen Sestanovich notes, there has 
been a definite tendency in the Russian political elite to create an external enemy 
sometime prior to an election campaign – the Chechens in 1999 are a prime 
example. (4) If that is the case, the US missile shield has served as a convenient 
red flag. But then the question arises: why the “reconciliation” in Maine? Here, 
one particular aspect of the summit should be addressed. 
 
Of the supposedly substantive results of the Lobster Summit was a proposal by 
Putin for a joint, bilateral US-Russian missile defense system in place of the one 
being planned for Poland and the Czech Republic, offering the use of the radar 
station in Gabala, Azerbaijan (currently leased to Russia). Though Bush 
described the proposal as “interesting,” (5) it seems unlikely that the US would 
simply agree to it and abandon the plans it has made for systems in Poland and 
in the Czech Republic. Since Putin was almost certainly aware of this, one can 
conclude that the proposal was a convenient way of ensuring he could claim that, 
at least, he tried. 
 
There appears to be a general disconnect between the tone of the dialogue 
during the summit and the actual state of US-Russian relations, because if the 
language became a bit more polite, the meeting accomplished nothing (at least in 
the short run) in terms of reducing tensions. On the contrary, less than two weeks 
after the summit Russia declared that it would no longer abide by the terms of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, albeit with the postscript that this 
“does not imply that we are shutting the doors to further dialogue." (6)  To be 
sure, this should not come entirely as a surprise, as warnings of such a step 
came as early as April. (7)  It is certainly a disappointment, however, to those 
who expected that the Kennebunkport summit would lead to significant positive 
developments in US-Russian relations. 
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The Russian CFE moratorium is a good indicator of the fact that the Lobster 
Summit did not significantly alter the trend in US-Russian relations, which can be 
said with reasonable confidence to be negative. Perhaps a bigger question is 
whether it shed any more light onto the importance of US-Russian relations – 
which, after all, remain vital in the long term even if they do not receive much 
contemporary attention. That, however, cannot be answered immediately; one 
will have to see whether more such lobster (or perhaps red herring) dinners will 
follow, and what will come of them.  
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GEORGIA 
UNOMIG on Russian involvement in Kodori  
The Joint Fact-Finding Group (JFFG) of the United Nations Observer Mission in 
Georgia (UNOMIG) has released a report regarding what it terms “the rocket 
firing incident” that took place in the upper Kodori valley on the night of 11 March 
2007. The upper Kodori Gorge is the only part of the separatist region of 
Abkhazia that remains under Georgian control and home to the pro-Tbilisi 
Abkhaz government-in-exile. From around 9:30 p.m. to 11 p.m. on 11 March, the 
towns of Adjara, Zima and, subsequently, Chkhalta came under rocket fire. 
 
The JFFG’s reliance on consensus precluded definitive statements on most of 
the major points under debate, including whether the Regional Administration 
building in Chkhalta, home of the Tbilisi-supported Abkhaz government-in-exile 
and the only building to be damaged in the incident, was targeted intentionally or 
simply was hit in the course of the attack. The JFFG is composed of 
representatives from the Abkhaz side, the Georgian side, the all-Russian 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Peacekeeping Force, and UNOMIG. 
The JFFG’s account of the investigation was hindered by the difficult task of 
issuing a report with which each contingent could agree. Despite the diplomatic 
inconclusiveness of the document, many of the findings point to possible Russian 
involvement in the attack, specifically through air support. 
 
There are several conclusions that may be drawn from the report. First, 
helicopters were used in the attack. The time of the attack and the high mountain 
terrain of the Kodori Gorge require that these helicopters be equipped with night 
vision equipment and flown by pilots with relevant experience. Both the Georgian 
and Abkhaz authorities have stated that they have no night vision capable 
helicopters, (1) but the Russian Air Force does possess such equipment. 
 
Second, the helicopters could not have come from west of the Kodori Gorge, due 
to the weather on the night of the attack. Conditions were very poor for flights to 
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the upper Kodori Gorge from the west, although flights from the north, east and 
southeast were “not unflyable but very difficult” (2) and “doable with considerable 
risks” for combat missions by experienced pilots. (3)  
 
Third, the report exempts Georgian, Abkhaz and CIS Peacekeeping Force 
aircraft from involvement in the incident. According to the Georgian radar 
authorities, no Abkhaz or CIS Peacekeeping Force helicopters took off from 
south of the Kodori Valley toward the valley anytime during the attack. The 
Georgian helicopters in the area were all accounted for, as well. Upon a request 
by the JFFG that Russian authorities provide records of flights in the north and 
south Caucasus around the Kodori Gorge during the time of the attack, Russian 
officials replied that there were no records because no flights had taken place 
during that time in the area in question. (4)  Although never stated directly in the 
report, given the demands of flying in the upper Kodori valley and the absence of 
other helicopters taking off from the areas occupied by the Abkhaz forces, a 
reasonable conclusion would be that the helicopters were Russian.   
 
The only building struck during the incident was the one that housed the Abkhaz 
government-in exile. This Regional Administration building was hit by either an 
AT-6 “SHTURM” or AT-9 “Ataka” anti-tank guided missile. According to the 
JFFG’s findings, this appears to have been the only missile launched via 
helicopter during the attack. (It is presumed that the helicopters also functioned 
as “artillery observers” and coordinated with the ground attack to direct the aim of 
the rocket fire.) (5)  Anti-tank missiles allow a degree of precision not possible 
with the rockets used in the attack (9M22 rockets launched using the 112mm 
BM21 system), leading to the conclusion that the building was targeted on 
purpose. (6) 
 
Although generally interpreted as a favorable outcome for Tbilisi, the report does 
question the lack of a Georgian response by ground forces to a presumably 
hostile attack. (7) 
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The report recommended the reactivation of a UN post in the upper Kodori 
valley, a proposal seconded by Georgia and agreed to by the Abkhaz, provided 
that UNOMIG troops continue to conduct patrols in company with the CIS 
Peacekeeping Force. (8) 
 
Following the release of the report, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a press 
release accusing Georgia of using the skirmish “to further harden its position” 
and of “taking deliberate steps to ratchet up the tension in the upper part of the 
Kodori Gorge.” (9)  Abkhaz authorities, in the person of de facto Foreign Minister 
Sergei Shamba, accused Georgian authorities of conducting provocations. 
Shamba stated that these supposed provocations “enjoy support from the 
outside,” a reference to a US statement welcoming UNOMIG’s report and 
affirming Georgia’s territorial integrity. (10)  Georgian officials reacted with mild 
optimism to the report and have used the opportunity to push for the reopening of 
a UNOMIG post in the upper Kodori Gorge. According to the UN Secretary 
General’s most recent report on the situation in Abkhazia, the process of 
reestablishing the base has already begun; the post is scheduled to be 
reactivated officially sometime in July. (11) 
 
Meskhetian Turk legislation passed  
The Georgian parliament has adopted a draft law on the repatriation of the 
Meskhetian Turks, a Muslim group deported from southern Georgia to 
Uzbekistan by Stalin in 1944 under charges of treason through collaboration with 
Germany and Turkey. The Meskhetians were part of the same wave of 
deportations that swept the Chechens, Tatars, Karachai and others to Central 
Asia.  
 
One of the conditions for Georgia’s admittance to the Council of Europe in 1999 
was that the Meskhetian Turks be repatriated by 2011. This issue has been 
debated hotly in Georgia for several reasons. The first is that Georgia still has a 
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large internally displaced population, due to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimated the number of 
internally displaced persons to be between 222,000 and 240,000, as of 
September 2006. (12)  Some opposition groups argue that Georgia must deal 
with this population before bringing in more individuals, who likely will require a 
great deal of resources. 
 
A second point of contention is the question of where the Meskhetians would live 
after repatriation. Traditionally, the Meskhetians are from Samtskhe-Javakhetia, 
an area in southern Georgia. The area is now home to the Adjarians, whom 
Stalin relocated there, as well as a sizable Armenian population. The majority 
(83.1%) of the Armenian population in this region does not speak Georgian and 
is somewhat isolated from mainstream Georgian culture, leading to fears about 
ethnic unrest. (13)  Some fear that reintroducing the Meskhetian population into a 
region already dominated by a large ethnic minority might only exacerbate 
existing tensions.  
 
A third area of concern for some opposition groups is that Meskhetian Turks 
might be loyal to Turkey, rather than Georgia, or that they might import a brand of 
radical Islam to Georgia. 
 
The legislation passed by parliament requires the Meskhetians to apply for 
repatriation between 1 January and 31 December 2008. They must submit 
documentation demonstrating that they or their forebears were victims of the 
1944 deportation. In addition, they must renounce citizenship from countries 
other than Georgia and pass tests in the Georgian language on Georgian history 
and the Georgian constitution, in order to obtain citizenship. The legislation allots 
no money for the Georgian government to aid the Meskhetians with resettlement 
costs. It also does not stipulate where the returnees will be allowed to live. 
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The total Meskhetian Turk population numbers around 300,000, with about 
100,000 living in southern Russia and about 1,000 having returned to Georgia. 
(14)  Of the total, former State Minister for Conflict Settlement Georgy 
Khaindrava places the estimate of likely returnees at between 25,000 and 30,000 
persons. That number is “more than Georgia can hope to cope with,” he adds. 
(15) 
 
Implementation of the law will be difficult and likely will result in increased 
tensions as the government decides whether to place restrictions on where the 
Meskhetians may resettle. The lack of sufficient financial support for returnees 
also may lead to friction. 
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TURKMENISTAN 
Turkmenistan progress report  
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s first six months in office have been a 
virtual whirlwind of activity, as he has undertaken a myriad of tasks intended to 
consolidate his own power, raise Turkmenistan’s international profile and 
reestablish ties with other countries in the region, roll back a few of the late 
President Saparmurat Niyazov’s more draconian social cuts, and begin seeking 
new investment and outlets for his country’s fossil fuel industry.   
Berdimuhamedov has made liberal use of both the carrot and the stick in 
achieving his aims, although thus far, he has applied the latter mainly in the 
pursuit of his domestic policy objectives. 
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His efforts to consolidate his own power have cut a wide swath through the ranks 
of government personnel, resulting in dozens of replacements and even a 
number of arrests, including that of presidential security service chief Lt.-Gen. 
Akmyrat Rejepov and his son, Nurmyrat Rejepov, a colonel in the national 
security services. (1)  Both men were arrested, businesses to which they are 
connected were searched and documents seized. (2)  First Deputy Minister of 
National Security Agajan Passyev and Interior Minister Akmammet Rakhmanov 
lost their positions, as well, although they were spared arrest.  (3)  The purge has 
not been limited to the security services: Railroad Transport Minister Orazberdi 
Khudoiberdiev and Ashgabat Mayor Orazmyrat Esenov have been replaced, (4) 
Enebay Atayewa has been removed both as head of the Women's Association 
(5) and Minister of Culture, Television and Radio Broadcasting, (6) Deputy 
Rector of Ashgabat State University Orazdurdy Saparov was fired, while Minister 
of Education Muhammetgeldi Annaamanov and Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet 
of Ministers Gurbannazar Amanmyradowic Asyrow were publicly reprimanded, 
(7) and Supreme Court Chairman Yagsygeldi Esenov also has been sacked, as 
well as many others. (8)  A number of the firings were conducted in a fairly 
humiliating and heavy-handed manner, with the miscreant receiving a public 
tongue-lashing from President Berdimuhamedov in front of an audience of 
his/her peers and underlings.  Although such tactics may succeed in intimidating 
his enemies, they also could result in the creation of new hostilities and harden 
the attitudes of his current opponents. 
 
The arrest of Lt.-Gen. Rejepov is the most significant and perhaps also the most 
surprising of all the personnel changes.  Rejepov was thought to be the force 
behind Berdimuhamedov’s rapid rise to power in the days immediately following 
Niyazov’s death, without whose help he would have been unable to sideline 
Avezgeldy Atayev, former Chairman of the Mejlis (Turkmenistan’s parliament) 
and heir apparent, quite so easily.  Mr. Atayev was arrested and charged with 
“abuse of power and violation of citizens' rights,” shortly after Niyazov’s passing, 
 29 
thus making him ineligible to assume the role of acting president. (9)  Rejepov, 
as head of the presidential security service, had 2,000 men under his command 
and is believed to have exercised a great deal of influence in the upper echelons 
of power, due to his 21 years of service for the late President Niyazov. (10)  His 
removal from power, along with that of the three other security service officials 
only a few months after Berdimuhamedov’s election to office is tantamount to a 
purge of the security services and implies that they played a major role in 
orchestrating what turned out to be a remarkably smooth transition of power.  As 
stalwart Niyazovites, however, they may not have supported the new president’s 
policy changes and surely would have challenged his claim to be a firm believer 
in and follower of the Turkmenbashy doctrine, once his initiatives on education 
and social reform were put into effect. 
 
Although, for the most part, Berdimuhamedov has retained the trappings of 
Niyazov’s cult of personality, has refrained from launching a full-scale dismantling 
of the hundreds of Niyazov monuments, portraits, statues, etc. (at least one 
monument in the town of Turkmenabat has been removed), (11) has continued to 
praise his predecessor and claims to be carrying his vision forward, in fact, his 
first actions as president have been to reverse a number of the late ruler’s 
decisions.  He has reinstated pensions for agricultural workers, increased the 
minimum pension amount, and included retirees who are unable to work the 20-
25 years required for pension eligibility due to sickness or the demands of child 
care in the pension benefits system.  He also has established a system 
somewhat akin to the “kindergeld” benefits provided in Germany: monthly 
payments to Turkmen mothers for each of their children until they reach 1.5 
years of age. (12)  Only one day after his inauguration, President 
Berdimuhamedov began tackling education reform, reinstating the mandatory 
ten-year school curriculum (that Niyazov had reduced to nine years) (13) and a 
few weeks later abolishing the requirement that all Turkmen high school 
graduates must work for two years before enrolling in university, as well as 
reintroducing university entrance examinations. (14)  The president decreed that 
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school teachers’ salaries also are to be increased by 40%, as of September 2007 
(15) and that one kindergarten and school are to be built in every regional capital, 
using revenue from natural gas sales. (16) 
 
These reforms may seem insignificant to many international observers, however, 
considering the fact that Niyazov spent his last years as president eliminating 
Turkmen citizens’ access to even the most basic state and social services (such 
as secondary education, health care, and retirement benefits), the fact that the 
Turkmen government once again is committing itself to support its own citizens is 
a huge step forward.   Berdimuhamedov’s plans seem to extend far beyond 
simply rebuilding what his predecessor demolished – in his publicly broadcast 
address to the 20th session of the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council), he told the 
assembled delegates: “It is necessary to build in districts and villages 
kindergartens, schools, hospitals, cultural centres, parks, houses and other 
cultural and entertainment facilities as well as telephone and Internet 
communications network. We should start all this as soon as possible.” (17)  The 
following day he signed a decree establishing a government commission to 
submit proposals for developing and modernizing the country’s rural areas. (18) 
 
Bringing all of Turkmenistan’s regions into the 21st century will require enormous 
government investments, to which end Berdimuhamedov has deviated from 
Niyazov’s isolationist policies by engaging in a whirlwind of meetings with the 
presidents of all of the Central Asian states, as well as with presidents Putin, 
Karzai, Hu Jintao, Ahmadinejad, Saakashvili and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah 
bin Abdul Aziz Al Sa’ud.  Prominent on the agenda of nearly every one of these 
meetings have been the twin issues of oil and gas development and pipeline 
routes.  The Turkmen president seems intent on attracting new investment in his 
country’s fossil fuel industry, whether it be funds for something as small as 
building a new refinery or the sizeable finances required for exploring and 
developing new gas fields, as well as soliciting interest and backing for new 
pipeline routes.  To date, he has promised to supply Russia, China and Iran with 
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natural gas and on 17 July signed what may be his country’s biggest gas contract 
yet: a commitment to supply China with 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas for 
the next 30 years.  Turkmenistan’s State Agency for the Supervision and Use of 
Oil and Gas Resources also signed a production-sharing agreement with China’s 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for the exploration and development of 
gas fields in the Bagtyyarlyk section of the Amu-Darya River’s right bank (located 
on the Uzbek border).  Along with these two contracts, Berdimuhamedov signed 
an agreement to accelerate the progress of a Turkmen-Chinese pipeline project, 
which is to be financed by the Chinese side and extend from the town of Olot 
(located on the Turkmen-Uzbek border) to the already existing Buxoro-Ural 
pipeline and from there to Kazakhstan, where it can be connected to the Kazakh-
Chinese pipeline. (19)  Berdimuhamedov claims that the new gas field in 
Bagtyyarlyk will enable his government to meet all of its existing gas supply 
commitments, but until an outside agency is able to verify Turkmen projections 
regarding the size of the new field, his claims will continue to appear somewhat 
dubious. 
 
A new pipeline route to the west, circumventing Russia, is also on the table – the 
Turkish government has proposed constructing a supply route for Turkmen and 
Iranian natural gas to Europe via Turkey, although without US approval, this plan 
is unlikely to bear any fruit.  Based on Berdimuhamedov’s recent meeting with 
President Karzai, even the proposed Trans-Afghan Pipeline (1,700-kilometre gas 
pipeline traveling from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan’s Herat, Farah, 
Helmand and Kandahar provinces to Pakistan) project still is considered to be 
very much alive, at least conceptually. (20) 
 
In any case, his zeal to bring new foreign investment to his country’s energy 
sector is raising Turkmenistan’s international profile as never before, which, while 
it may prove lucrative for the economy, also will focus more outside attention on 
domestic affairs and such issues as human rights and civil freedoms.  These are 
two areas that Berdimuhamedov thus far has neglected – no political prisoners 
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have been amnestied, the Turkmen opposition remains in exile and excluded 
from any political dialogue, and freedom of expression still seems to be, at best, 
an abstract concept.  Perhaps, once the new president has finished conducting 
all of his desired personnel replacements he will feel more secure in his authority 
and will start to remedy not only the country’s social and material shortcomings, 
but its political deficiencies, as well. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine’s long learning curve 
Without a doubt, Ukraine has come far since its independence just 16 years ago.  
The national language is slowly rebounding, the economy is shifting to market 
principles, the press is largely free, a nascent middle class has appeared, and 
the country’s “orange revolution” ushered in a level of political competition that is 
unrivaled anywhere else in the region. 
 
But even 16 years since independence and 17 years after declaring sovereignty, 
many of Ukraine’s political leaders reflexively fall back into a Soviet mindset 
when dealing with immediate, urgent problems facing their own citizens.  Nothing 
has demonstrated this more clearly in recent years than the response of political 
leaders to a major phosphorus spill on 16 July.   
 
The spill occurred after 15 train tanker cars containing yellow (also known as 
white) phosphorus derailed in the Lviv region.  The derailment caused a leak in 
one of the cars that led to explosions in six of the derailed carriages.  It is unclear 
what led to the derailment, or whether conditions for safely maintaining the 
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phosphorus had been met.  The substance, which was being transported through 
Ukraine from Kazakhstan to Poland, is unstable and highly combustible if allowed 
to come into contact with oxygen. It must be kept submerged in water at cool 
temperatures (below 38-40 degrees Celsius).  The abnormally high temperature 
in Lviv on 16 July was at least 36 degrees Celsius. 
 
The explosion released large, but unknown, quantities of phosphorus into the air, 
at first igniting what was described as a “rolling fire cloud” and then settling into a 
large, gray toxic cloud covering 50 square miles of the region. (1) 
 
Very quickly it became apparent that the region did not have all the necessary 
equipment on hand to fight the blaze.  Although the emergency workers had an 
adequate supply of foam to smother the chemical, the firefighters themselves 
had little protective equipment.   In the first hours, Reuters video and other 
photos showed firefighters battling the fire with bare hands and standard water 
shields over their faces. 
 
Not long after the fire began, a number of firefighters and the first local 
government workers on the scene were rushed to the hospital with respiratory 
problems.  One worker remained in critical condition for at least two days. 
 
However, in general, officials from Lviv’s Health and Emergency departments 
responded quickly following the accident.  Within hours, 200 people from the 
immediate area were assisted in evacuating, although the evacuation was not 
mandatory. 
 
When completed, over 800 people decided to leave their homes.  Over 18,000 
residents in 14 towns and villages were quickly warned to stay inside with the 
doors and windows shut. (2)   Local officials also began alerting citizens to 
symptoms of phosphorus poisoning, which can be fatal, and include severe 
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respiratory distress, anemia, “disturbances of vision, speech and movement,” 
tremors, fatigue and nausea.  (3) 
 
However, once the national government took over, residents stopped receiving 
clear information. The Emergencies Ministry and Health Ministry officials arrived, 
led by Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk.  The choice of Kuzmuk to 
represent the government’s interests at the accident site was curious, but sent a 
significant signal. 
 
As Defense Minister in President Leonid Kuchma’s government from 1996-2001 
and 2004, Kuzmuk presided over a series of mishaps that cost dozens of lives.  
Those mishaps included the errant launch of a surface-to-surface missile during 
a military exercise in 2000.  The missile hit an apartment building in a town 
outside Kyiv, killing three persons.  Less than one year later, a stray missile 
destroyed a Russian Sibir Passenger Airliner, killing all 78 passengers on board.  
Kuzmuk initially covered up the government’s culpability in both of these 
incidents. 
 
In fact, Kuzmuk has resorted repeatedly to the Soviet technique of information 
manipulation, instead of dealing with a problem in response to a crisis.  His latest 
work in Lviv won’t change that fact. 
 
Not long after arriving on the scene of the phosphorus spill on 16 July, Kuzmuk 
implied a comparison to Chornobyl, causing widespread panic.  Then, in an 
attempt to undo this damage, certain emergency officials apparently instructed 
clean-up workers not to wear gas masks.  “The management forbids the people 
to wear gas masks, so as not to create panic,” said one female emergency 
worker to journalists from Korrespondent Ukraine.  “No one thinks about our 
health.  I have a small daughter, for example.  What will happen if I fall ill?” (6)  
The order to keep gas masks off appears to have been rescinded after only a few 
hours. 
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The day after the accident, the Ministry of Health announced that doctors had 
examined 5,000 residents and “found no symptoms of poisoning.”  (7)  By then, 
however, the number of people checking into the hospital with symptoms related 
to phosphorus poisoning had begun to rise – from 14, after the fire, to 60 one day 
later.  The final number of those who were hospitalized would end up around 
180. 
 
On 18 July, the Emergencies Ministry lashed out at the mass media for 
spreading “unchecked rumors that do not correspond to reality” after numerous 
outlets questioned the condition of the soil and air, and also the veracity of 
statements about testing done on residents. (8)  Kuzmuk then urged residents to 
come out of their homes and enjoy the air.  “People can breathe safely and 
confidently in the area, drink water from their wells, harvest their crops, graze 
their livestock and swim in ponds.” (9) 
 
The response from residents was disbelief.  “They tell us not to be upset,” 
Oleksandr Shakh, the head of the Ozhidov village council, told Korrespondent 
Ukraine.  “But we do not believe them.  We see that the toxic smoke continues to 
poison the entire region.  I will honestly tell you: if I weren’t the head of the village 
council, I would have left long ago.”  (10) 
 
The disbelief was understandable.  Throughout Soviet times, information was 
manipulated to such an extent that it simply was safer not to believe anything the 
authorities said.  This mindset still prevails among a significant portion of society 
– for good reason. 
 
In April of 2000, following the destruction of the apartment complex by a stray 
missile, the authorities (including Kuzmuk) suggested that the incident may have 
been caused by the storage of illegal ammunition.   Finally, after pressure from 
opposition politicians and the media, they announced the truth. 
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Similarly, after another stray missile downed the Russian passenger airliner in 
2001, Ukraine denied all responsibility.  “Ukraine’s missiles which were used in a 
military training exercise on the Crimean peninsula could not hit the Russian TU-
154 plane,” a Defense Ministry spokesman said.  (11)  Only ten days later did 
President Kuchma admit his country’s culpability. 
 
And of course, the most famous (or perhaps infamous) case of information 
manipulation in Ukraine came following the Chornobyl reactor meltdown.  Soviet 
authorities made no comment for three full days, choosing not to inform their 
citizens.  Finally, when the authorities did issue a statement, it was terse.  ''An 
accident has taken place at the Chernobyl power station, and one of the reactors 
was damaged,” the statement read.  “Measures are being taken to eliminate the 
consequences of the accident. Those affected by it are being given assistance. A 
government commission has been set up.” (12) 
 
It is clear, then, why the residents in villages surrounding the accident, having 
witnessed a fire ball and the resulting cloud of gas and smoke, would be hesitant 
to believe that all was well.  Their disbelief becomes even more understandable 
in the light of a statement by Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, who seemed 
to echo part of the Chornobyl statement, suggesting, “We have already started to 
fund the work to fully eliminate the consequences. … “Within an hour [of the 
accident] a governmental commission was working on the spot.” (13) 
 
Residents also were bombarded with assurances that seemed illogical or 
contradictory.  The Health Ministry reported phosphorus levels 30 times above 
normal in the soil surrounding the accident, while the Emergencies Ministry said 
levels were normal.  The media showed firefighters battling the fire for at least six 
hours.  Deputy Prime Minister Azarov suggested it was extinguished in 15 
minutes.  And residents were told that testing had found no phosphorus 
poisoning, even though 180 persons had been hospitalized. 
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In response, three days after the accident, President Yushchenko lashed out at 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and his cabinet.  “The Soviet practice of 
placating reports instead of professional actions and concealment instead of 
honest information must not be a norm in Ukraine,” he said.  This was the first 
comment by the president on the issue.  He then traveled on 20 July to Lviv to 
“inspect the accident scene” and visit patients in the hospital.  (14) 
 
In fact, the responses of the country’s political leaders were slow in coming and 
far from the responses to similar incidents in most Western states. The 
President’s visit occurred four days after the incident, while Prime Minister 
Yanukovych never visited the site at all.  The Emergencies Minister also did not 
arrive near the site for three days. 
 
At the same time, basic needs like water were not met immediately, even though 
local officials were telling residents not to drink the water from their wells.  The 
opposition Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko eventually delivered over 260 tons of water 
to area residents, following television appeals for assistance from local leaders.  
(15)  Tymoshenko and Yushchenko have both called for the resignations of the 
Transportation and Emergency Ministers. 
 
Although it seems the health threat was limited and has dissipated, this accident 
has spotlighted real problems in the ability of some of Ukraine’s politicians to 
inform their citizens of danger and explain what may have happened in a crisis. 
For the first time, this fact has been acknowledged by Ukraine’s leading 
politicians, including Prime Minister Yanukovych.  On his party’s website, 
Yanukovych acknowledges “during the liquidation of the phosphorus accident…, 
the citizens were misinformed by officials.”  (16)  The statement is significant.  It 
remains to be seen, however, whether this comment is similar to earlier mea 
culpa statements made by President Kuchma following the missile incidents, or 
whether it signals a possible real change. 
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Regardless, it does seem that the decision of Yushchenko to visit Lviv—even 
late—and the mobilization of volunteers and political party representatives from 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc to deliver water may be signs that the country has 
begun to shake off the edges of its Soviet history. 
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